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This study quantifies the possible consequences to stakeholders of reforms to the excise tax on 
reversions of excess pension assets. Under the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA), funding in 
defined benefit plans is likely to improve significantly. Many plans may become overfunded 
over time, owing to the shortfall amortizations mandated by the PPA, as well as to precautionary 
contributions by sponsors and to plan investment returns. This analysis shows that a more 
moderate excise tax rate together with a reasonable funding threshold for asset reversions would 
not only enable sponsors to spend the excess funds on other corporate needs, thereby lowering 
the cost of sponsorship of defined benefit plans, but also would open a considerable revenue 
source for the government, with only a small increase in bankruptcy cost for the PBGC. Plan 
participants could also gain in an alternative reform, which would require a partial transfer of 
excess assets to them along with a still-lower reversion tax rate. 
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Reform of the Tax on Reversions of Excess Pension Assets 
Gaobo Pang and Mark Warshawsky  
 
 
In August 2006, the Congress passed, and President Bush signed, the Pension Protection 
Act (PPA). This legislation addressed almost all aspects of law affecting defined benefit (DB) 
pension plans, except for the penalty tax on excess asset reversions.  Policy logic suggests, 
however, that the reversion tax also be considered as part of this broad reform.   
The PPA requires DB plan sponsors to tend to any underfunding more quickly, steadily 
and completely than ever before.1 The new requirements are expected to reduce losses to plan 
participants of accrued benefits and losses to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) 
for guaranteed benefits from underfunded plans of failed sponsors. Stated another way, the new 
law holds plan sponsors more accountable for their obligations to pension participants. That 
being the case, the setting of compatible incentives would call for allowing plan sponsors to draw 
upon excess pension assets — after paying appropriate taxes — when plan obligations are 
adequately secured. Otherwise, the cost of sponsoring DB plans will be unnecessarily high.  
Moreover, as many plans become better funded, and indeed under most common investment 
policies, overfunded, excess assets will build up but be locked in the plans.2,3 The federal 
government in particular may lose the considerable revenues it could otherwise collect if taxes 
were paid on asset reversions. 
 
Current Law on the Taxation of Excess Asset Reversions 
Generally, under current law, employers may withdraw assets from a pension plan only 
after terminating the plan, which requires the sponsor to satisfy all liabilities and vest all accrued 
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benefits fully and immediately (one exception is explained below). Reversing the favorable tax 
treatment accorded to employer contributions, these withdrawals are subject to corporate income 
taxes (currently the federal income tax rate is 35 percent and some states charge their own 
corporate income taxes). The federal government also imposes an excise tax, partly to recover 
the tax-free buildup accumulated through investment returns on plan assets. This excise tax, 
however, is also a penalty tax, as explained in the next section, reflecting the historical view that 
excess asset reversions from pensions to plan sponsors were wrong and subject to corporate 
abuse.   
The excise tax rate is 50 percent. It drops to 20 percent if the sponsor allocates a portion 
of the reversion to plan participants, either by benefit improvements immediately before plan 
termination or by funding benefits under another tax-qualified retirement plan, or if the plan 
sponsor is in bankruptcy proceeding. Assets transferred to participants in another plan must equal 
at least 25 percent of the potential reversion. The qualified replacement plan must cover at least 
95 percent of the active participants in the terminated plan who remain employed with the 
sponsor. If the replacement plan is a defined contribution (DC) plan, the transferred assets must 
be allocated within seven years and are subject to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) dollar 
limits on DC plan contributions. If the sponsor allocates assets to participants by increasing 
benefits before plan termination, it must spend at least 20 percent of the reversion value on the 
benefit improvements. This must be done on a pro rata basis for all active and most inactive 
participants.  
In any case, whether the excise tax rate is 50 percent or 20 percent, the plan sponsor 
realizes very little net gain from an excess asset reversion after paying corporate income taxes, 
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any transfers, and other transaction and termination expenses.4 Not surprisingly, such 
transactions have ceased to occur.5     
In one notable exception to the prohibition against asset reversions from an active 
pension plan, sponsors may transfer pension plan assets on a tax-free basis to a retiree medical 
account that is set up as a separate account of the plan. Under section 420 of the Code, as 
amended by the PPA, an employer may transfer excess pension assets to retiree medical accounts 
to fund the expected cost of retiree medical benefits for the transfer period of the current year 
and up to nine (and at least one) future years. The law defines excess pension assets as assets in 
excess of 120 percent of the target liability for funding purposes; moreover, the sponsor must 
maintain this funding status during the transfer period. In a qualified transfer, benefits accrued 
under the pension plan must be fully and immediately vested and the employer must meet a 
standard of no reduction in the average amount of employer cost for retiree health benefits for 
current year and the following four years. Alternatively, the law allows a more limited year-by-
year asset transfer for plans that are at least 125 percent funded (this alternative does not require 
a particular sustained funding status for the pension plan beyond normal compliance with the 
funding rules; it does, however, require a five-year maintenance-of-effort for the retiree medical 
plan).   
 
History of the Excise Tax 
In the early 1980s, interest rates were unusually high, thus increasing corporate 
borrowing costs and decreasing pension liabilities, which are the discounted present value of 
accrued benefits. This, in concert with a strong stock market, pushed many plans well beyond 
full funding. Some plan sponsors responded by terminating their plans, retrieving the excess 
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pension assets (after paying the corporate income tax) and setting up replacement retirement 
plans. A few of these sponsors and plan terminations were involved in highly publicized 
“corporate raider” takeovers.     
In 1984, the federal pension regulatory agencies required sponsors of terminating plans to 
buy immediate or deferred life annuities from insurance companies for plan benefits to protect 
employees from market fluctuations.6 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 levied a 10 percent excise 
tax on excess asset reversions. But reversions continued, with controversy, so Congress stepped 
up the tax rate to 15 percent in 1988 and to 50 percent in 1990.  Although the link in the public 
mind between reversion and unpopular takeover and leveraged buyout activity was one reason 
for the increasingly punitive excise tax, proponents cited two other, more benefit-related, reasons 
for the increases. First, they claimed that reducing the cushion of excess assets would make 
benefits less secure, exposing both plan participants and the PBGC to larger losses. Although this 
claim may have had some validity when funding rules were weaker, its advocates did not counter 
propose to allow reversions if funding was above a highly conservative level of, say, 150 percent 
of plan liability.   Second, supporters of harsher reversion penalties insisted that any excess 
assets either be reserved for benefit improvements or be paid directly to plan participants. This 
“tails I win, heads you lose” attitude may have made strategic sense for long-term labor-
management relations, given the stigma once attached to terminating or freezing a DB plan. That 
stigma, however, has since disappeared, as it has become common for even highly profitable 
sponsors to freeze their DB plans. Moreover, this attitude, embodied in legislation, does not 
endear DB plans to their sponsors and, it may be argued, leads ironically to lower funding and, 
likely, to declining DB plan sponsorship. Ippolito (2001) has shown empirically that the higher 
excise taxes on asset reversions played a significant role in reducing pension overfunding 
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through the 1990s; this reduction, in turn, left plans exposed to the decline in discount rates and 
equity values in the early 2000s.   
Nevertheless, the political arguments against asset reversions are powerful and were used 
successfully in the past to beat back attempts to pass reforms. They held sway in 1996 against a 
proposal to lower the excise tax to 6.5 percent and to allow reversions, even without plan 
termination, if funding was at 125 percent of liability. The risk of an adverse political reaction 
also convinced the Bush Administration to leave a change of the tax on excess asset reversions 
out of its comprehensive 2005 pension reform proposal.   
 
Determination of “Fair” Value for the Excise Tax 
As noted above, some share of the excise tax fairly recaptures the portion of the reverted 
pension assets that arises from preferential tax treatment. The General Accounting Office (GAO, 
1989) randomly selected and reviewed 18 out of a universe of 202 reversions for $1 million or 
more that terminated or announced their intention to terminate in 1988. It constructed a 
simulation model to calculate an appropriately offsetting excise tax rate for each case. The rate 
was determined as the one that would have left sponsors no better off financially than if the 
surplus assets had earned the pension fund’s pretax rate of return through some alternative, non-
tax-favored non-pension use. The GAO considered various assumptions for the sponsor’s 
marginal corporate income tax rate necessary for the calculation, including the statutory and the 
(lower) average effective corporate tax rates. 
The GAO reported that the excise taxes required to recapture the tax benefits from excess 
pension assets ranged from -7 to 84 percent, with medians (depending on the specific corporate 
income tax rate used) at 24 or 29 percent. The highest excise tax rates were for plans primarily 
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invested in bonds, which are highly taxed in non-pension corporate accounts, and the lowest 
were for plans primarily invested in equities. Presumably, with tax rates on equity investments 
lowered since 2003, and most pension plans predominately invested in equities, equivalent “fair” 
tax rates would be lower nowadays. Of course, the fair tax rate would be altered upward slightly 
if plans follow the more recent trend to lower equity investment.  
Although not reported by the GAO, it is possible to calculate an average tax rate, 
weighted by plan excess assets in the 18 cases, under the GAO’s 1989 assumptions. Employing 
the effective corporate income tax rate in the calculation, the resulting fair excise tax rate, on a 
weighted average basis, is 19 percent. The weighted average is a more appropriate estimate of 
the tax revenue lost to the favorable tax treatment accorded to pensions, so 19 percent is more 
reasonable to use as the fair rate.   
A comparable situation to the United States exists in Canada. If a sponsor wants to 
terminate (“wind up”) its pension plan, it must, at least in Ontario and some other provinces, 
receive the consent of plan participants on the disposition of excess assets. This is done through 
negotiations, arbitration or court proceedings. In practical terms, the outcome is the imposition of 
“tax” from the viewpoint of the plan sponsor. Moreover, owing to the Monsanto decision by 
Supreme Court of Canada in 2004, the requirements for consent, etc. apply even in the case of a 
partial wind up, where only a portion of the work force is laid off (see Watson Wyatt Worldwide 
(2004) for more details).  
 
Funding Prospect of Post-PPA Pension Plans 
There are three major forces that will drive the improvement in the funding status of DB 
plans going forward. The first and most fundamental one is the new PPA funding rules. The PPA 
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seven-year amortization schedule (or faster six-year schedule for some severely underfunded 
plans) together with the normal cost contribution and limited use of credit balances mandates 
sponsors to contribute funds as necessary, and effectively form a lower support for the funding 
ratio as long as the sponsors are in business operation. Moreover, plan sponsors may well choose 
to set a higher funding target owing to a precautionary purpose and thus contribute more than 
this PPA-required minimum. The second force is the investment return. Many plans hold a 
substantial fraction of their assets in a growth investment portfolio, which implies opportunities 
to realize the equity premium, while the downside risk, from the perspective of plan participants, 
is mitigated by the new PPA funding rules. This investment-led asset buildup may take place for 
on-going plans, and, especially, for frozen or shrinking pension plans with no benefit accrual, 
because in many of these cases the growth of assets is likely to exceed that of liabilities and 
hence helps build excess assets. The third force is the asymmetry regarding asset disposals 
between underfunding and overfunding under current law. That is, plan sponsors have to 
contribute whenever there is a funding shortfall, but excess assets will remain locked in the plan 
and thus continue to compound if the punitive reversion taxes under current law and the 
administrative costs of plan terminations continue. 
 
Reform Proposals 
 The first proposal for reform of the excise tax regime examined here keys off parameters 
in current law. It recognizes the improved funding rules and current pension environment, 
including plan freezes, the dearth of new DB plans and fewer significant benefit improvements. 
It proposes a lower excise tax rate at 20 percent and would allow excess asset reversions for 
plans funded at least at 120 percent of their liabilities. As in current law, sponsors would have to 
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fully vest accrued benefits, though they would not have to terminate their plans.7  The proposal’s 
intent is to lower the cost of sponsoring a DB plan and raise revenue for federal government, 
while securing plan participants’ benefits.  
Alternatively, we model two other proposals. One would require a funded status of at 
least 125 percent; the other would impose a 15 percent excise tax and require a 10 percent 
transfer to participants. Also, the main proposal and the two alternatives go with a lower excise 
tax rate – 15 percent – on asset reversions in bankruptcy, instead of the 20 percent under current 
law.  In the final report of the “Conversation on Coverage” organized by the Pension Rights 
Center (2007), the working group on DB plans recommended a new type of hybrid plan. As part 
of this suggestion, the group advocated for a “Side-Car Trust” to increase funding flexibility, 
which would allow for employer withdrawals subject to income tax and a 12 percent excise tax, 
as long as the plan is at least 110 percent funded. Although there are some other slight 
differences in conditions and terms from the proposal, examined here, the Conversation on 
Coverage group is more generous to plan sponsors than this proposal. 
 
Methodology for Analysis of the Proposal8 
We first lay out the dynamics of pension assets. Let At denote the market value of pension 
assets in year t, Rt gross return on investment, tP  annual benefit payout, and tX  contributions to 
pension plans if 0>tX  or assets reverted back to plan sponsors if 0<tX . Then pension assets 
evolve according to equation (1) below: 
)(11 ttttt XPARA +−= ++       (1)  
For simplicity, assets are assumed to be invested in two classes: equities with fraction tα  and 
bonds with (1- tα ), and hence, bttettt RRR 111 )1( +++ −+= αα , where the gross returns of equity and 
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bonds, etR  and 
b
tR , respectively, are assumed to be log normally distributed.  The dynamics of 





ttt PLrDrL −+∆−+= +++ φ      (2)  
where Lt denotes the pension liabilities accrued as of year t. The liabilities are generally 
measured as the net present value (NPV) of future benefit payouts and they accrue interest at 
discount rate dtr . As the discount rate has a significant impact on the NPV calculation, the term 
Drdt 1+∆−  is used to reflect the impact of its changes multiplied by the liability duration D. A 
small percentage swing in the discount rate often results in a large increase or decrease in 
liabilities because the duration is typically long. The parameter tφ  indicates the growth rate of 
pension liabilities that are associated with the normal cost or annual gross benefit accrual.  
To compare the reform proposal with current law, we establish metrics to measure 
sponsors’ payoff from funding status outcomes and contribution/reversion decisions.  This 
analysis assumes that plan sponsors benefit from higher rather than lower funding levels, which 
is consistent with the observation that sponsors generally care about their company image, in 
both financial and labor markets, and they value ease in workforce-management relations. In 
addition, under the PPA, sponsors of well-funded pension plans gain considerably more 
flexibility in funding and benefit policy changes compared to sponsors of “at-risk” poorly funded 
plans. In the model, plan sponsors try to improve current funding status, when necessary, also 
considering expected future funding outcomes given the uncertainty of investment returns and 
liability valuations.  
Specifically, let ttt LAs /=  be the funding ratio. The sponsor’s payoff tU  from the 
funding status can be defined in a recursive pattern in equation (3) below: 
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⎧ += tttt UEsU      (3) 
where η  is elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) – a smaller value implies a stronger 
desire for smooth rather than large and volatile year-to-year changes in funding ratios, ρ  is the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA), which indicates a sponsor’s reluctance to take risks 
regarding future uncertain funding outcomes, β  is the rate at which sponsors discount future 
expected payoffs, and tE  is the expectation operator over future payoffs. This class of functional 
forms was first introduced by Epstein and Zin (1989) and is used widely in academic research in 
financial economics.9   
A well-defined maximization problem generally requires a budget constraint. It is, 
however, a formidable task to model the complex corporate revenue-generating process and the 
optimal revenue split between a pension plan and operating capital needs. We therefore take a 
shortcut. We assume that corporations have unlimited capacity to make contributions as needed, 
but that contributions are not without cost. That is, contributions yield negative payoff to 
sponsors, while assets reverted give a positive payoff.  Consistent with current law, the model 
incorporates the asymmetrical taxation of contributions and asset reversions. Specifically, 
contributions are tax-deductible at the corporate income tax rate. Reversions are subject to the 
excise tax in addition to the income tax. Let tz  be contributions or reversions net of all taxes 
applicable, expressed as a fraction of liabilities. The payoff function of contributions/reversions 




−= on.contributifor     ,










V      (4) 
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We impose restrictions 11 <γ  and 12 >γ  for the following reasons: 1) the marginal gain from 
asset reversions is generally diminishing, hence, 11 <γ ; 2) the marginal cost of contributions is 
increasing, hence, 12 >γ , which implies that a steady flow of moderate contributions is more 
desirable than a bumpy flow. These two conditions ensure that the payoff function in (4) is 
globally concave over all values of contributions and reversions. This technical subtlety has an 
important implication here: plan sponsors are committed to pension liabilities and have no 
intention of abandoning an underfunded pension plan, i.e., exercising the pension put option 
(Sharpe 1976). That is, they remain risk-averse and continue to try to remedy any underfunding, 
rather than switch to a risk-tolerant behavior and bet on high asset returns, as would be otherwise 
implied by 12 <γ .10 
The plan sponsor’s problem in each period is to choose the optimal contribution or 
reversion so as to maximize the total payoff defined as the sum of equations (3) and (4), i.e., the 
objective function in equation (5) below: 
tt VU +  .        (5) 
As no analytical solution to the model exists, numerical methods are used. The computation 
begins by discretizing the continuous-state variables (assets and liabilities).  The maximization 
problem is then solved from the last period backward to the first period for all possible 
combinations of state grid points and realizations of random variables (equity-bond returns and 
pension discount rates). Given the optimal decision rules recorded along this backward process, a 
large number of Monte Carlo simulations are finally carried out to generate the best actions 
(contribution or reversion) for sponsors from the first period forward to the last period of the 
analysis. 
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Before displaying results, a further explanation of the specific parameter values listed in 
Table 1 below is appropriate here. The value of relative risk aversion 2=ρ  is borrowed from 
the household investment and consumption literature, but its value is at the lower end of the 
range because corporations are generally more risk-tolerant than individuals. Plan sponsors 
desire a smooth change in funding status, with 10.=η , that is, they try to fill any funding gap, 
often contributing more than the minimum required contribution to that end, but do so gradually. 
The discount rate for future payoff in equation (3) is set equal to the rate of liability interest 
accrual, i.e., 95.0=β , being the reciprocal of average gross bond return. The payoff parameters 
( 5.01 =γ  and 22 =γ ) in equation (4) are set to mimic the behavior of a responsible sponsor, as 
stated above.  
Table 1 here 
In our base case, we assume that the plan sponsor invests plan assets in a consistent and 
constant proportionality of 60 percent equities and 40 percent bonds. Although plans do verge 
from this average mix, over time and across plan situations, it is nonetheless a good 
approximation of the central tendency of most pension funds in most time periods. Both 
academics and consultants have urged plan sponsors generally to move toward a liability-
directed investment strategy, which generally means more and longer-term bonds, but many plan 
sponsors feel strongly that they want to capture the equity premium. Indeed, even the strongest 
academic advocates of “immunization” acknowledge that if a pension plan, sponsored by a 
healthy profitable risk-tolerant employer, is an on-going, growing, and long-term retirement 
vehicle then higher return and risk investments like equities can be part of the fund mix. 
Nevertheless, in our simulations below we also consider alternative investment approaches with 
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higher proportions in lower return and risk investments like bonds, either on a dynamic or static 
basis.   
The distributions of nominal yearly equity return (mean 9.2 percent and standard 
deviation 16.1 percent) and bond return (mean 5.7 percent and standard deviation 11.9 percent) 
are based on Watson Wyatt January 2007 U.S. Asset Return Assumptions, which are in turn 
derived through a blend of economic theory, historical analysis and the views of investment 
managers. The distribution of pension liability discount rates (mean 6.1 percent and standard 
deviation 0.6 percent) is estimated on composite corporate bond rates from 2001-2007 drawn 
from the IRS data. The duration of liabilities (12 years), the nominal annual benefit accrual rate 
(4 percent of liabilities) and the annual benefit payout (3 percent of liabilities) are largely 
consistent with many U.S. pension plans.  
The model incorporates the new funding rules imposed by the PPA. Specifically, 
sponsors of plans that are at least 70 percent funded have seven years to amortize any shortfalls. 
Less well-funded plans must amortize shortfalls at a faster pace – six years in the model. If the 
funding ratio drops below 60 percent, the plan will be frozen and benefit accrual will cease. If 
the value of plan assets reaches the sum of liabilities plus normal cost, the amortization base 
automatically resets to zero. Under the PPA, the minimum required contribution is the shortfall 
amortization charge plus the target normal cost (that is, the value of benefits accrued during the 
year).11 Plan sponsors may contribute more than the minimum contribution, up to an additional 
funding cushion of 50 percent of liabilities. This range of contributions is fully tax-deductible, 
and we assume corporations always have the capacity to make contributions unless they are in 
bankruptcy.   
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We also assume that sponsors of both well- and underfunded plans face an exogenous 
bankruptcy shock of 0.49 percent probability per annum, which is based on Moody’s global 
analysis of the default probability for issues of corporate bonds rated Baa for 1920-2005. In 
bankruptcy, plan assets and liabilities are transferred to the PBGC, which bankrolls the gap 
between assets and 120 percent of liabilities if the plan lacks sufficient assets. The extra 20 
percent cost is for “pop-up” benefits and administrative costs in a terminating plan situation. The 
PBGC usually recovers an average of 10 percent of the deficit from the bankrupt sponsor’s 
corporate assets, so we make that assumption. We assume that plans whose funding falls below 
40 percent undergo a forced termination by the PBGC, and the PBGC is responsible for funding 
the plan up to 120 percent of liabilities, using the same procedure as in bankruptcy. 
Under current law, asset reversions are subject to possible alternatives, as stated above. 
Rather than coding all the regulatory details in the model, we assume that reversions in the 
benchmark must pay 50 percent excise tax and the federal and state corporate income taxes, at 35 
and 5 percent, respectively. Miscellaneous market and administrative costs associated with a plan 
termination amount to another 20 percent. This approach, though slightly sketchy, is consistent 
with the reality that plan sponsors currently realize very little from a reversion. These extra costs 
cease to be applicable in the reform proposals, because they would neither require plan 
termination nor restrict the use of assets reverted. 
 
Simulation Results  
Without loss of generality, we consider a single pension plan with initial liabilities of $5 
million and a wide range of initial funding statuses: the market value of plan assets being 80-100 
percent of liabilities, uniformly distributed. We run 10,000 simulations, each corresponding to a 
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40-year path of stochastic outcomes of assets and liabilities. For the practical policy interest, we 
limit the statistics shown to the first 20 years of the analysis. The results on the single plan may 
be aggregated, with further modest assumptions, to yield economy-wide meanings. We report the 
effect of the proposals versus current law.  We report separately the results for “payoff-
maximizing” plans, which make optimal contributions or reversions, when applicable, to 
maximize the objective function (5), and the results for “contribution-minimizing” plans, which 
make only the PPA-required minimum contributions in the case of underfunding and still 
optimize function (5) in the case of overfunding to determine the desirable excess asset 
reversion. We then further explore alternative situations by changing some of the key 
assumptions. 
Results for Payoff-Maximizing Plans.  First we report the benchmark results for payoff-
maximizing pension plans under current law. The simulations show that the average asset-
liability ratio will likely rise to above 1.6 in 20 years (Figure 1a). Several factors drive this 
steady improvement: 1) the PPA’s seven-year amortization schedule (or faster six-year schedule 
for some underfunded plans) together with the normal cost contributions mandates sponsors to 
contribute funds as necessary and effectively forms a lower support for the funding distribution – 
indeed, the PPA-required minimum contributions alone would push the funding ratio to over 1.2 
in 20 years (Figure 3); 2) the plan sponsor values a healthy funding status and hence will 
contribute more than the PPA-required minimum – Figure 2a shows the percentage of scenarios 
in the 10,000 simulations in which positive contributions are made (solid line), along with the 
percentage of scenarios in which no contributions are required at all (dashed line); 3) the 
constant 60-40 split between equity and bond investments implies opportunities to realize the 
equity premium; and 4) excess assets remain locked in the plan due to the punitive reversion 
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taxes and thus returns continue to compound – the only excess asset reversions occur in 
bankruptcy (circled line in Figure 2a). 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 here 
The reform proposal allows the sponsor to withdraw excess assets if plan funding tops 
120 percent of liabilities. This would lower the average funding ratio, but still slightly above 1.2, 
in 20 years (Figure 1b) – because it would be in the interest of plan sponsors to withdraw excess 
assets when the payoff is positive net of the lower-than-before reversion tax. In Figure 2b, the 
dashed line indicates the percentage of fully- or over-funded outcomes in all the simulations. 
Approximately half of those outcomes are associated with excess asset reversions, as indicated 
by the circled line in the figure.  
At first glance, the lower funding ratios might suggest that the reform is not a good idea. 
This impression is soon dispelled, however, by examining the redistribution of the excess funds. 
Table 2 reports the breakdown of costs or benefits among plan sponsors, the government, the 
PBGC and plan participants, with all numbers calculated as present discounted values over 20 
years and averaged over the 10,000 simulations.   
Table 2 here 
The net contribution cost for a plan sponsor equals all contributions after income tax 
deduction minus all reversions net of income and excise taxes.12 This cost reflects the true 
financing burden for DB plan sponsors, taking into account mandatory obligations and potential 
benefits. The simulations show that the net contribution cost for sponsors averages roughly $4.5 
million under current law ($7.7 million before tax deduction), while asset reversions under the 
proposal help whittle the cost to roughly $3.8 million (though total gross contributions are larger 
– $8.5 million – before tax deductions and reversions).  
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The government loses tax revenue on plan contributions and recovers it partially or 
completely through income and excise taxes on reversions. The net costs under current law are 
roughly $2.6 million for the federal government and $0.4 million for state governments. Under 
the proposal, the net costs would be about $1.1 million for the federal government and $0.3 
million for state governments. Allowing asset reversions would divert more revenue to the 
government.13   
The proposed reform would imply slightly higher contingent liabilities to the PBGC: 
average plan termination costs associated with bankruptcies or forced terminations would be 
approximately $0.09 million under the proposal, compared with roughly $0.08 million under 
current law. It is, however, worth noting that if plan sponsors expect no gain from overfunding 
and so choose to contribute only the minimum required, the average bankruptcy cost would go 
even higher –around $0.12 million (see Table 3). The total loss for both the government and the 
PBGC would be $1.5 million under the proposal, less than half of the $3.1 million under current 
law. In short, the proposal would turn out to be a Pareto improvement with the government and 
PBGC considered as an integrated entity, that is, all stakeholders gain from this change.14  
Table 3 here  
We also considered a higher funding trigger under Alternative 1 – 125 percent – for any 
asset reversion. Compared with the above proposal, this would yield higher asset-liability ratios 
for most years (Figure 1c), with the gain ranging between 0 and 5 percentage points on average; 
correspondingly, the fraction of plans overfunded is slightly higher and the fraction of them 
exercising reversions is slightly lower (Figure 2c). This, however, does not translate to 
significantly lower potential bankruptcy cost for the PBGC (column 3 in Table 2). 
Comparatively, this alternative implies higher contribution cost for sponsors ($3.8 million) and a 
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lower tax recovery for the government (i.e., a larger revenue loss $1.5 million, federal plus state), 
both mainly due to smaller and fewer asset reversions.  
Under Alternative 2 we considered an excise tax rate of 15 percent combined with a 10 
percent transfer of excess assets to plan participants. The average funding status would be almost 
identical to the trajectory under the first proposal (Figure 1d). Plan participants would gain from 
this redistribution arrangement – an approximately $0.3 million transfer out of the excess funds 
being reverted (column 4 in Table 2). The participants’ gain is diverted in part from the 
sponsor’s benefit and in part from the government’s potential revenue, and, as a result, the net 
contribution cost for the former and the revenue loss for the latter would be greater than under 
the other proposal. This alternative proposal would not significantly alter the PBGC’s expected 
average bankruptcy cost.  
Results for Contribution-Minimizing Plans.  Some sponsors choose to contribute only the 
minimum required to their plans, either because finances are tight or because they ascribe less 
value to full funding than we assume optimizing plan sponsors do. We therefore explore the 
effects of reform proposals on these contribution-minimizing plans.   
Even making the minimum contributions, plans with a 60-40 equity/bond asset allocation 
will eventually become overfunded, albeit at a slower pace, as indicated in Figure 3a. This 
slower funding route implies that fewer plans would be well-funded (dashed lines in Figure 4) 
and thus fewer reversions would occur. It is unambiguous, however, that the reversion tax reform 
proposals would benefit the plan sponsors for a lower net contribution cost, the government for a 
lower tax revenue loss and the plan participants for real transfers, albeit at smaller magnitudes 
(Table 3). As before, a lower excise tax would unlock excess assets for sponsors, which implies a 
somewhat smaller asset cushion for adverse shocks and a slightly higher potential bankruptcy 
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cost for the PBGC, but the average funding status would remain above 100 percent (Figure 3 b-
d).   
Figure 4 here 
Results for Plans with Varying Asset Allocations. Some economic theories and actuarial 
literature suggest that the sponsors of well-funded pension plans may be better off if they lower 
their risk by adopting a more conservative investment portfolio that more closely matches plan 
assets with liabilities. The rationale is that risk-taking can be put to better use in more rewarding 
corporate functions than in pension plans. This argument is particularly convincing under current 
law, because the punitive reversion taxes yield little symmetric reward for taking on pension risk. 
We therefore conduct an experiment to examine the possible impact of the reform proposal for 
pension plans that adopt this investment strategy. Specifically, we assume that plans start with 
the 60-40 asset split between equities and bonds, but then irrevocably switch to a 20-80 split 
once plan funding status reaches 130 percent.   
With asset allocations modified at high funding levels, the strategy apparently limits the 
upward potential for asset returns. In 20 years, the funding levels under current law are projected 
to be around 150 percent for payoff-maximizing plans (Figure 5a) and 115 percent for 
contribution-minimizing plans (Figure 5c). At the same time, the switch to a conservative 
portfolio reduces the volatility of the market value of pension assets, which implies fewer or 
smaller funding shortfalls. As a result of these two offsetting forces, the net contribution cost for 
plan sponsors and tax deduction cost for the government are only marginally different than the 
results of a constant 60/40 asset split (column 1 in Table 4 vs. column 1 in Table 2). This 
difference is more negligible for the contribution-minimizing plans (column 3 in Table 4 vs. 
column 1 in Table 3).   
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Figure 5 and Table 4 here 
On the other hand, with lower investment returns, the potential efficiency improvement 
also would be lower from the proposed reform. That is, the reform would still benefit all 
stakeholders, but there would be fewer asset reversions for plan sponsors (column 2 in Table 4 
vs. column 2 in Table 2) and less tax recovery for the government (column 4 in Table 4 vs. 
column 2 in Table 3). 
More Alternative Situations.  Many plan sponsors realize an effective corporate income tax 
rate lower than 35 percent, owing to various tax credits and deductions. As an approximation, we 
apply a 25 percent effective federal corporate income tax rate to the payoff-maximizing plans, 
without changing the 5 percent state tax.15 A lower effective tax rate implies fewer tax benefits 
on contributions, i.e., higher net contribution cost. As a result, the asset release from a reversion 
is more beneficial to the sponsor – the improvement margin is $1.1 million (5.16-4.06) in Table 
5 compared with $0.8 million (4.53-3.75) in Table 2. On the other side of the equation, this lower 
effective tax rate means less revenue loss for the federal government in the first place under 
current law, so less revenue is recovered – a revenue gain of $1.2 million (1.82-0.65) in Table 5 
versus $1.5 million (2.62-1.13) in Table 2. 
Table 5 here 
Clearly, asset returns play a significant role because they affect the amount of assets 
available for reversion, thereby altering the effect of tax reforms. Moreover, asset allocations in 
some pension plans may deviate from the 60-40 split between equities and bonds from the very 
beginning, in contrast to the strategy of changing the asset allocation after the plan becomes 
well-funded.   
   
21
We consider a conservative portfolio with a 20 percent equity/80 percent bonds asset 
allocation, along with the PPA-required minimum contributions. The reversion tax reform has 
the least impact in this situation. This portfolio would yield an asset-liability ratio around 1.1 in 
20 years, absent reversions under current law, and around 1 under the proposal and the two 
alternatives for the same time horizon (figures not shown).  Unsurprisingly, the potential benefit 
of reversion tax reforms shrinks substantially for each stakeholder, but the comparison still 
supports the previous finding that the reform reduces the inefficiency (see Table 6).  
 Table 6 here 
As mandated by the PPA, plan sponsors must contribute at least the amortization charge 
plus normal cost. Some plans may prefer to contribute more than the minimum to fill the funding 
gap more quickly. Contribution amounts desired are modeled by the parameter value of η, in 
addition to the forceful PPA rules. We alter η to 0.2, a value higher than the benchmark 0.1. 
Larger contributions, together with the usual 60-40 portfolio, help plan assets easily reach and 
exceed the value of liabilities, which in turn implies much lower average potential costs for the 
PBGC – $0.06 million under current law and $0.08 million under the proposal (Table 7). The 
funding threshold for reversion would guide plan assets to settle at around 120 percent of 
liabilities under the proposal and alternative 2, and at 125 percent of liabilities under alternative 
1. The reform proposal in this situation would also give the federal government a greater gain – a 
$2.1 million revenue recovery versus the $1.5 million in Table 2 (similarly for state government, 
albeit by a smaller margin). 
Table 7 here 
Some plans may face a higher normal cost, so we also compare the proposal with current 
law for sponsors with a 5 percent gross annual benefit accrual. The asset portfolio is the common 
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60-40/equity-bond split. Clearly, faster-growing liabilities signify a greater need for continuous 
contributions, more income tax deductions on these contributions and less room for asset 
reversion, other things equal. In other words, plan sponsors now face a larger contribution cost 
and the government a larger revenue loss. Despite these quantitative differences, the tax reform 
would provide comparable gains, albeit of a somewhat smaller magnitude, to those in the other 
situations – a $1.1 million gain for the sponsors and a $2.1 million loss reduction for the 
government and the PBGC together (columns 1 and 2 in Table 8). Some other plans, particularly 
those frozen or shrinking plans, on the contrary, may face a lower normal cost. We consider a 2 
percent annual benefit accrual and compare the proposal again with current law. Given this 
slower pace of liability accumulation, sponsors generally face a lower contribution burden and 
the government loses less tax revenue in the first place under current law. Nevertheless, the 
efficiency improvement implied by the proposal remains significant – a $0.6 million gain for the 
sponsors and a $1.1 million loss reduction for the government and the PBGC together (columns 
3 and 4 in Table 8).  
Table 8 here  
Taken together, the results in the various situations convey the same key message: with 
pension plans now supported and guarded by the PPA, a lower reversion tax may introduce a 
slightly higher bankruptcy risk to the PBGC, but that would be overshadowed by the gains for 
plan sponsors, participants, and the government and the PBGC in combination. 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
With the passage of the PPA, DB pension plan sponsors are more accountable for their 
funding obligations. The minimum contributions mandated by the PPA will boost plan funding. 
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A precautionary plan sponsor with a concern for its reputation may choose to contribute more 
than this minimum, which, along with common investment policies, will likely make its plan 
well- or even overfunded. In this better-funded plan universe, it becomes necessary to consider 
the best way to utilize excess assets in overfunded plans. 
Lowering the excise tax rate and establishing a reasonable funding threshold for asset 
reversions would not only free up excess funds for other corporate needs, thereby lowering the 
cost of DB plan sponsorship, but also open a considerable revenue source for the government, 
with only a modest increase in bankruptcy cost projected for the PBGC. Alternatively, a lower 
reversion tax combined with a partial transfer of excess assets to plan participants would also 
improve the current system, providing benefits to all stakeholders. In short, with restored 
symmetric and positive incentives for plan sponsors, the reversion tax reform may help 
encourage rather than erode the establishment and maintenance of DB pension plans. 
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Table 1. Benchmark Assumptions 
 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Relative risk aversion ρ = 2 Shortfall amortization & other rules PPA  
Elasticity of Intertemporal Sub. η = 0.1 Yearly bankruptcy probability 0.49% 
Payoff discount factor β = 0.95 Funded status for termination by PBGC 40% 
Payoff of contribution/reversion γ1 = 0.5, γ2 = 2 Termination cost 20% 
Equity share α = 0.6 Bankruptcy deficit recovery 10% 
Equity return (mean, std. dev.) (9.2%, 16.1%) Federal corp. income tax rate 35% 
Bond return (mean, std. dev.) (5.7%, 11.9%) State corp. income tax rate 5% 
Average liability duration 12 years Excise tax rate 50% 
Liab. discount rate (mean, std.) (6.1%, 0.6%) Initial pension accrued liabilities $5m 
Annual benefit accrual (% of liab.) 4% Initial funded status  80-100% 
Annual benefit payout (% of liab.) 3%  (uniform distribution)  
Source: Authors’ assumptions based on data, literature and current law. 
 








(Excise tax 20%; 
reversion trigger 
120%) 
Alternative 1  








1) Contribution cost for sponsors  4.53 3.75 3.77 3.85 
2) Cost for government & PBGC 3.08 1.48 1.55 1.58 
         Federal revenue loss 2.62 1.13 1.20 1.23 
         State revenue loss 0.38 0.26 0.26 0.25 
         PBGC bankruptcy cost  0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 
3) Transfer to participants -- -- -- 0.27 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 3. Redistribution of Excess Assets – Contribution-Minimizing Plans ($millions, PDV) 
 




(Excise tax 20%; 
reversion trigger 
120%) 
Alternative 1  








1) Contribution cost for sponsors  2.62 2.42 2.44 2.53 
2) Cost for government & PBGC 1.86 1.36 1.42 1.42 
         Federal revenue loss 1.52 1.05 1.11 1.10 
         State revenue loss 0.22 0.18 0.19 0.19 
         PBGC bankruptcy cost  0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 
3) Transfer to participants -- -- -- 0.06 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Payoff-Maximizing Plans Contribution-Minimizing Plans 











(Excise tax 20%; 
reversion trigger 
120%) 
1) Contribution cost for sponsors  4.55 3.83 2.62 2.44 
2) Cost for government & PBGC 3.09 1.70 1.84 1.44 
         Federal revenue loss 2.63 1.33 1.52 1.13 
         State revenue loss 0.38 0.27 0.22 0.19 
         PBGC bankruptcy cost  0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 5. Redistribution of Excess Assets – Payoff-Maximizing Plans with Effective Federal 
Corporate Income Tax Rate of 25% ($ millions, PDV) 
 
 Current Law 
(Excise tax 50%) 
Proposal 
(Excise tax 20%; 
reversion trigger 120%) 
1) Contribution cost for sponsors  5.16 4.06 
2) Cost for government & PBGC 2.29 0.99 
         Federal revenue loss 1.82 0.65 
         State revenue loss 0.37 0.25 
         PBGC bankruptcy cost  0.08 0.09 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 6. Redistribution of Excess Assets – Contribution-Minimizing Plans with 
Conservative Investment Portfolio (20% equity and 80% bonds, $ millions, PDV) 
 




(Excise tax 20%; 
reversion trigger 
120%) 
Alternative 1  








1) Contribution cost for sponsors  3.11 3.01 3.03 3.07 
2) Cost for government & PBGC 2.21 1.92 1.97 1.94 
         Federal revenue loss 1.81 1.54 1.59 1.55 
         State revenue loss 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.24 
         PBGC bankruptcy cost  0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 
3) Transfer to participants -- -- -- 0.02 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 7. Redistribution of Excess Assets – Payoff-Maximizing Plans  with η = 0.2 ($ 
millions, PDV) 
 
 Current Law 
(Excise tax 50%) 
Proposal 
(Excise tax 20%; 
reversion trigger 120%) 
1) Contribution cost for sponsors  5.00 4.08 
2) Cost for government & PBGC 3.35 1.11 
         Federal revenue loss 2.87 0.78 
         State revenue loss 0.41 0.26 
         PBGC bankruptcy cost  0.06 0.08 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Table 8. Redistribution of Excess Assets – Payoff-Maximizing Plans ($ millions, PDV) 
 
 5% Annual Benefit Accrual 2% Annual Benefit Accrual 











(Excise tax 20%; 
reversion trigger 
120%) 
1) Contribution cost for sponsors  6.09 4.96 2.33 1.69 
2) Cost for government & PBGC 4.11 2.00 1.62 0.51 
         Federal revenue loss 3.52 1.56 1.34 0.31 
         State revenue loss 0.51 0.34 0.19 0.11 
         PBGC bankruptcy cost  0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
   
28













































































































   
29
















































































   
30









































































































   
31
 















































































   
32
Figure 5. Average Funding Ratios – Varying Asset Allocations 
 




















































































Source: Authors’ simulations. 




                                                 
1 As shown in Warshawsky (2007), the PPA establishes a much-improved environment for the sponsorship of DB 
plans; that paper also includes a summary of the new funding rules and the perspective of a former administration 
official describing the policy goals sought through reform.  
2 Reports, from a variety of sources, based on 2006 financial accounting disclosures, already show a significant 
improvement in plan funding compared to a couple of years ago. 
3 This observation does not apply to a small number of plans that provide, by plan document language, for the 
allocation of excess plan assets to participants upon termination. 
4 Sponsors must file IRS Form 5330 to report the excise tax paid on reversion of qualified plan assets and, in 
particular, an explanation for an excise tax rate other than 50 percent, if applicable. 
5 The excise taxes on reversions of qualified plan assets to employers amounted to $22 million in 1999 and $46 
million in 2000, and then declined to zero in 2004 and thereafter. Source: Table 21. Federal Excise Taxes Reported 
to or Collected by the Internal Revenue Service, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, and Customs 
Services, 1999-2006. 
6 Alternatively, if allowed by the plan, lump-sum payouts can be made. 
7 It may be reasonable, in order to further enhance benefit security, to require plan sponsors to adjust their funding 
“credit balances” to take account of an asset reversion. 
8 In the interest of parsimony, the model ignores employee contributions, plan expenses, actuarial gains and losses 
other than investment and discount, and other presumably non-significant items. 
9 One defining feature of the Epstein-Zin form is the separation of EIS and RRA which facilitates modeling 
corporate behavior. The constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) function, another common form in the literature, is a 
special case of Epstein-Zin where RRA is the reciprocal of EIS, i.e., ρη /1= .  With the CRRA form, however, a 
low value of EIS that is reasonable to reflect plan sponsors desiring gradual improvement in funding would imply 
unrealistically high risk aversion for corporations. 
10 Some sponsors in financial distress might purposefully take a more aggressive investment portfolio, which implies 
risk for the PBGC. This betting behavior, however, is unlikely to be affected by a reversion tax reform because the 
reform releases excess assets only when the pension plan is overfunded. 
11 Funding rules in PPA are more complex than indicated here; in particular, we ignore smoothing, credit balances, 
exemptions, elections, and transition rules. 
12 Pension plan contributions are income tax deductible. For instance, a sponsor’s real cost for a $1 million 
contribution is $1(1 – 0.4) = $0.6 million at a 40 percent combined federal and state income tax rate.  
13 If the effective corporate income tax rate fluctuates and plan sponsors have the timing flexibility, they may choose 
to contribute heavily when the tax rate is high and make a reversion when it is low. This would imply that the gain 
from the reversion tax reform would be somewhat greater for sponsors and smaller for the government than 
estimated here. 
14 Given a set of alternative allocations and a set of individuals, a movement from one allocation to another that can 
make at least one individual better off, without making any other individual worse off, is called a Pareto 
improvement, after Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist who used the concept in his studies of economic efficiency 
and income distribution. 
15 The effective corporate income tax rate varies widely from industry to industry. The GAO (1989) refers to 21 
percent as one of the lowest effective tax rates among its 18 termination cases.  
